El marxismo y el socialismo ético by Llorente, Renzo
 
 
 MARXISM AND ETHICAL SOCIALISM.  
MAYO-AGOSTO. (2020). Vol. 2 (4), pp. 47 - 56. 
47 
ES
SA
YS
 
Dialektika REVISTA DE INVESTIGACIÓN FILOSÓFICA Y TEORÍA SOCIAL
 Marxism and Ethical Socialism 
El Marxismo y el Socialismo Ético  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Renzo Llorente 1* 
1* Division of Humanities, Saint Louis University, Madrid, 
España.  
Email: renzo.llorente@slu.edu  
ORCID ID:  https://orcid.org/0000‐0003‐0017‐0213  
Resumen: Quizá el legado más notable del llamado marxismo 
analítico  sea  la  tesis,  defendida  por  algunos  destacados 
representantes de esta corriente filosófica, según la cual las 
razones  que  impulsan  a Marx  y  al marxismo a  condenar  el 
capitalismo y defender el socialismo son, en el fondo, de una 
naturaleza moral. Si asumimos esta interpretación de Marx y 
del  marxismo,  nos  veremos  obligados  a  reconsiderar  la 
relación entre el marxismo y otra tradición socialista para la 
cual los valores morales también son fundamentales, a saber, 
el llamado “socialismo ético”. Si al reconsiderar esta relación 
dejamos de lado algunas ideas falsas, si bien muy extendidas, 
con respecto a la naturaleza del socialismo ético (tales como 
la  creencia  de  que  implica  una  política  reformista  o  el 
supuesto  de  que  sea  idéntico  al  “socialismo  utópico”), 
descubrimos que  la dicotomía entre el socialismo ético y el 
socialismo  marxista  resulta  insostenible,  al  menos  en  los 
términos en los que ha sido planteado hasta ahora. 
Palabras  clave:  Marxismo;  socialismo  ético;  Roy  Edgley; 
socialismo utópico; Norman Geras. 
Abstract: One of the principal legacies of analytical Marxism 
has been a moralization  of Marxism,  for  some of  the most 
influential analytical Marxists came to endorse the view that 
the  Marxist  condemnation  of  capitalism  and  defense  of 
socialism  ultimately  derive  from  normative  ethical 
considerations. If we accept this new interpretation of Marx 
and Marxism, with its emphasis on the moral foundations of 
Marxist doctrine, we are forced to reconsider the relationship 
between Marxism  and  another  socialist  tradition  for which 
moral  commitments  are  also  fundamental,  namely  ethical 
socialism.  If  our  reconsideration  of  this  relationship  avoids 
common misconceptions about ethical socialism (such as the 
idea  that  it  implies  reformism,  or  that  it  is  identical  to 
“utopian  socialism”),  we  find  that  the  dichotomy  between 
ethical socialism and Marxist socialism proves untenable, at 
least in the terms in which it has usually been formulated. 
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INTRODUCTION  
here seems to be little doubt that the principal legacy of 
analytical Marxism—leaving aside the wholly negative 
contribution, as it were, resulting from the analytical 
Marxists’ vigorous criticism and dismissal of many basic 
Marxist theses—has been an unabashed moralization of 
Marxism.1 That is to say, few would deny that, so far as the 
interpretation of Marx and Marxism are concerned, the most 
notable, lasting effect of this movement has been an 
insistence on, and vindication of, the normative moral 
dimensions of Marxist doctrine. This is evident in many of 
the contributions to specific debates on the moral status of 
Marx’s thought, as well as in a number of the texts that aim 
at a broader, more synthetic and systematic analysis of Marx 
and the Marxist tradition. A good example of the latter is 
furnished by Jon Elster’s conclusion to his Making Sense of 
Marx (1985), which vividly evokes the legacy to which I am 
referring:  
It is not possible today, morally or intellectually, to be a 
Marxist in the traditional sense. ... But...I believe it is still 
possible to be a Marxist in a rather different sense of the 
term. I find that most of the views that I hold to be true 
and  important,  I  can  trace back  to Marx.  This  includes 
methodology,  substantive  theories  and,  above  all, 
values.  The  critique  of  exploitation  and  alienation 
remains central (p. 531; emphasis in the original). 
Yet, while most commentators would probably accept the 
above characterization of analytical Marxism’s legacy, few 
have considered what is, to my mind, an obvious and 
important implication of this development, namely, that it 
tends to decisively undermine the distinction—long 
accepted by the vast majority of Marxists—between Marxist 
socialism and ethical socialism.2 In other words, to the extent 
that we endorse this moralization of Marxism, the familiar 
claim that Marxist socialism is fundamentally opposed to  
 
 
1 I borrow the concept of a “moralized Marxism” from Kai Nielsen 
(1989), p. 272. 
 
2 For a study that does examine some aspects of this development, 
yet without analyzing the nature of ethical socialism, see Roberts 
(1996), chapter 7. 
 
 
ethical socialism becomes untenable. That this conclusion is 
unavoidable, without being the least bit undesirable (at least 
from a Marxist perspective), is the claim that I set out to 
defend in the remainder of this paper.   
My essay has five sections, apart from the introduction. I 
begin by briefly reviewing the various meanings and uses of 
the term “ethical socialism” and also provide the definition 
of ethical socialism that I shall be using. The following section 
of the paper then canvasses five common misconceptions, or 
unwarranted assumptions, regarding ethical socialism. In 
section three of the paper, I argue that if we employ the 
definition of ethical socialism that I have proposed, avoid the 
errors discussed in section two and accept the view that 
Marxism condemns capitalism and advocates socialism 
partly (or entirely) on moral grounds, then the dichotomy 
between ethical socialism and Marxist socialism proves 
untenable, at least in the terms in which it has usually been 
formulated. In this section, I also discuss two claims often 
used in support of the standard counterposition of ethical 
socialism and Marxism. The fourth section of the essay 
briefly addresses an objection, advanced by some Marxists, to 
an interpretation of Marxism that makes normative moral 
commitments central to, and the foundation of, the Marxist 
outlook. The paper then concludes with some reflections on 
the implications of adopting the interpretation of Marxism 
that foregrounds the doctrine’s moral dimension. 
I 
What, exactly, is “ethical socialism”?3 Given the frequency 
with which this term has appeared in Marxist literature, it is 
natural to assume that the term has a fairly determinate 
meaning. In fact, the term “ethical socialism”—which was 
not current in Marx’s time and, to my knowledge, was not 
employed by Marx  and  Engels themselves — has been,  and 
 
3 Given the aims of this essay, I do not think it necessary to offer a 
precise definition of socialism. But I would argue that Tom 
Bottomore is correct in characterizing socialism, in very general 
terms, as “a social order in which there is the maximum feasible 
equality of access, for all human beings, to economic resources, to 
knowledge, and to political power, and the minimum possible 
domination exercised by any individual or social group over any 
others” (as cited in Self, 1993, p. 343). 
T
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continues to be, used to designate a number of different, 
sometimes quite divergent, theoretical and political 
positions. For example, the term “ethical socialism” is 
sometimes used as a rough synonym for what Marxists have 
conventionally referred to as “utopian socialism,” that is, the 
emancipatory projects developed by Owen, Saint-Simon, and 
Fourier. Then again, “ethical socialism” sometimes refers to 
Eduard Bernstein’s “revisionist” version of Marxism 
developed at the end of the nineteenth century. (Indeed, the 
term apparently first gained currency as a result of the 
debates and polemics occasioned by Bernstein’s work.) At 
the same time, the term “ethical socialism” is also often used 
to identify the early twentieth-century movement in 
philosophy that sought to fashion a kind of neo-Kantian 
Marxism. Finally, the phrase “ethical socialism” is also 
sometimes used to characterize or evoke the politics 
associated with a tradition within British socialism, the best-
known exponent of which was doubtless R. H. Tawney.4  
It should be clear, even from this extremely brief summary, 
that the term “ethical socialism” has been used quite broadly. 
But this is hardly surprising, considering that writers who 
avail themselves of the term seldom take the trouble to define 
it. For our present purposes, I think we would do well to 
adopt a definition offered by Roy Edgley: “the political 
tendency that advocates socialism as centrally involving, 
even based on, a set of ethical or moral values, values that are 
perhaps distinctively socialist” (1990, p. 21).5 I find this 
definition especially well-suited for my aims in the present 
essay not only because it covers the different varieties of 
ethical socialism already noted, but also because Edgely was 
himself both a Marxist and dismissive of ethical socialism. In 
any event, once we have accepted a definition along these 
lines, the question then becomes: What follows from such a 
 
4 I do not mean to suggest that this list is by any means exhaustive, 
but I would argue that it does cover the most important uses of the 
term. 
 
5 Cf. the definition of ethical socialism proposed by Peter Self (1993): 
“the belief that socialism must be founded upon and reflect the 
acceptable moral principles of a good society” (p. 337). A much more 
idiosyncratic definition of ethical socialism is provided by Norman 
Dennis and A. H. Halsey (1988): “Ethical socialism is a radical 
tradition which makes heroic claims on people and on the society 
that nurtures them. It offers both a code of conduct for individuals 
conception of ethical socialism? Or rather: Does it entail 
anything that a Marxist should necessarily object to? 
II 
As it turns out, much of the antipathy that Marxists feel 
toward ethical socialism would seem to derive from a number 
of unjustified beliefs about the concept of ethical socialism, 
unjustified, at any rate, if we proceed from Edgley’s 
definition. What are some of these beliefs?   
First of all, there is a not uncommon tendency to believe that 
ethical socialism denotes much the same thing as “utopian 
socialism.” In other words, Marxists tend to conflate ethical 
and utopian socialism6 or to assimilate the former to the 
latter. Yet there is, in fact, a scant justification for such a 
belief, as becomes clear if we recall the defining features of 
utopian socialism. Gareth Stedman Jones (1983) summarizes 
these features as follows: first, the ambition to construct a 
new science of human nature; secondly, a focus on the 
moral/ideological sphere as the determining basis of all other 
aspects of human behavior; third, the ambition to make this 
sphere the object of an exact science which will resolve the 
problems of social harmony; fourth, the assumption that pre-
existing moral, religious, and political theory is the main 
obstacle to the actualization of the newly discovered laws of 
harmony; and, finally, the rejection of any distinction 
between the physical and social sciences (p. 505; emphasis in 
the original).7 One might also mention, of course, other views 
for which Marx and Engels took the utopian socialists to task, 
such as their proclivity for creating detailed political 
blueprints for the future, their failure to ground their theories 
in objective social tendencies or their disregard for the 
question of revolutionary agency. At any rate, the point is 
and a guide to social reform aimed at creating optimal conditions 
for the highest possible moral attainment of every person” (p. 1). 
 
6 See, for example, Anderson (1980, p. 98); Nielsen (1989, p. 19); and 
Levine (2005, p. 625). 
 
7 In fact, Stedman Jones identifies the theses listed here as “common 
presuppositions distinctive of pre-Marxist socialist thought,” but 
the brief essay in which they appear is a dictionary entry on “utopian 
socialism.” 
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that ethical socialism per se does not imply any of these 
things, at least if we accept Edgley’s definition of this concept.  
A second misconception shaping Marxists’ thinking about 
ethical socialism (and probably a result of the habit of 
identifying ethical socialism with utopian socialism) involves 
the tendency to assume that ethical socialism necessarily 
implies a commitment to (cross-class) moral advocacy or 
moral suasion as the primary means, or principal 
mechanism, for bringing about socialism.8 That is, it is widely 
assumed that if we conceive of socialism “as centrally 
involving, even based on, a set of ethical or moral values, 
values that are perhaps distinctively socialist,” it follows that 
we must privilege, if not rely exclusively on, moral appeals 
and exhortation—ethical consciousness-raising, as it were—
to the neglect of other forms of political engagement, such as 
party activity, the mobilization of labor, etc. Yet this 
assumption likewise proves ill-founded, conflating as it does 
two distinct aspects of agency, namely the motivational or 
justificatory aspect of agency—the reasons that prompt a 
disposition to act for certain ends—and the operational 
aspect of agency, that is, the actual actions that an agent 
performs with a view toward achieving her ends. To 
“advocate socialism as centrally involving, even based on, a 
set of ethical or moral values, values that are perhaps 
distinctively socialist” in no way implies, either logically or in 
practice, a commitment to moral advocacy as the preferred, 
if not exclusive, method for bringing about socialism.  
A third, typical error in thinking about ethical socialism 
consists in equating ethical socialism with reformism.9 On 
this (erroneous) view, ethical socialism entails a commitment 
to parliamentarism as the only legitimate means of effecting 
the transition to a socialist society, and so more or less 
 
 
8 “As they [Kautsky, Lenin and others] saw it, the various non-
Marxian schools of socialist thought could be called ‘ethical 
socialism’ since they tended to predicate socialism on the moral 
‘ought’” (Tucker, 1969, p. 33). The assumption that I am discussing is 
implicit in the view described by Tucker, and is likewise implicit in 
Edgley’s remark (1990) to the effect that “the ideological character of 
its [ethical socialism’s] idealist moralism weakens the socialist 
movement…by devaluing the need both for theory and practice. For if 
(moral) ideas are prior to action, what is chiefly necessary, if we are to 
change things, is to get our (moral) ideas right, and the rest will follow” 
(pp. 27-28). Rosa Luxemburg (2004b) implicitly identifies this 
assumption with “utopian socialism” (p. 242).  
 
excludes, among other things, recourse to violence. Once 
again, such a conclusion simply does not follow from the 
conception stated above: there is nothing inconsistent about 
the idea of using revolutionary measures—notably, 
violence—to bring into being a system that embodies a 
particular set of moral values, just as there is nothing 
inherently inconsistent in a police officer’s use of violence, or 
a country’s resort to war, to bring about a state of peace (we 
should bear in mind, incidentally, that all major ethical 
theories license the use of violence under certain 
circumstances, and most versions of one highly influential 
moral theory, utilitarianism, even enjoin it in many instances 
to secure the best result). In any event, the notion that 
advocacy of socialism “as centrally involving, even based on, 
a set of ethical or moral values” amounts to a prohibition on 
violence appears especially bizarre when one recalls that 
some of the most resolutely and unambiguously ethical 
socialists have ultimately taken up arms to achieve their aims. 
Think, for example, of the case of Camilo Torres, the 
Colombian priest whose moral outrage over social injustice 
led him to become a guerrilla insurgent (and to die in 
combat).10  
A fourth unjustified assumption regarding ethical socialism 
consists in the belief that advocating socialism “as centrally 
involving, even based on, a set of ethical or moral values” is 
in some sense at odds with the belief that workers and their 
allies should, and do, struggle for socialism because it is in 
their material interests. Apart from the fact that adherence to 
a doctrine may of course be motivated by more than one basic 
consideration, one reason that it is a mistake to counterpose 
a political commitment based on material interests to one 
based on moral values is that a person’s moral values 
9 This is, for example, the tenor of the entry on ethical socialism in 
an East German dictionary of “scientific socialism” (Ethischer 
Sozialismus, 1984) which explicitly associates this doctrine with 
Eduard Bernstein (p. 94). For another text that associates ethical 
socialism with reformism, see the last source cited in note 5. 
 
10 The case of William Morris, in many ways a paradigmatic ethical 
socialist, is also instructive in this connection. As E. P. Thompson 
(1994) has noted, at the end of his life Morris regarded “an ultimate 
revolutionary confrontation” (i.e., violence) as inevitable, even 
though Morris’s views followed from what Thompson calls “his 
moral criticism of society” (pp. 67 and 66). 
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normally play some part in defining her interests, or at least 
her perception of these interests. I shall return to this 
question below. 
The last unwarranted assumption that I wish to mention 
consists in the notion that an ethical socialism is necessarily 
incompatible with a scientific socialism, by which I mean, to 
quote Hal Draper (1990), a conception of socialism 
“base[d]...on a knowledgeable analysis of the real forces 
operating in society” (p. 7). Despite its widespread 
acceptance, the dichotomy between ethical socialism and 
scientifically-based socialism plainly represents a false 
dichotomy. One can be committed to both a scientific 
analysis of real social forces and trends, an empirically 
informed revolutionary perspective, and so on, and at the 
same time bring an ethical or normative framework to bear 
on one’s assessment of these trends and to guide one’s 
political activity. Indeed, it is difficult to see how one could 
possibly do without the latter. This is, of course, merely 
another way of suggesting that far from there being a 
fundamental incompatibility between positive and 
normative considerations, the fact/value distinction (or the 
“is/ought” problem) actually requires that we supplement 
science with normative commitments. I say a bit more about 
this below. 
III 
It should now be evident, I hope, that ethical socialism, 
construed as “the political tendency that advocates socialism 
as centrally involving, even based on, a set of ethical or moral 
values, values that are perhaps distinctively socialist,” does 
not necessarily imply any of the theoretical views or 
substantive positions with which it is usually associated, and 
owing to which it is generally dismissed, by Marxists. For this 
reason alone, the characteristic Marxist hostility toward the 
idea of ethical socialism appears entirely unwarranted. 
Indeed, rather than rejecting ethical socialism outright, as 
 
11 According to one such interpretation, that of the influential 
analytical Marxist John E. Roemer (1994), “the ethical 
condemnation of capitalism that should be taken to lie at the 
foundation of the Marxist charge of exploitation is, in fact, one based 
on the unjust inequality of distribution of ownership rights in the 
means of production” (p. 15; emphasis added). 
12 Here I am following G. A. Cohen (1995) in identifying human self-
realization, community and equality as goods that are central to the 
Marxist outlook (p. 5). There are countless passages in Marx and 
they often do, Marxists should acknowledge that Marxism 
has much in common with ethical socialism, at least if they 
believe that Marx and Marxists base their denunciation and 
rejection of capitalism, and advocacy of socialism, partly on 
moral grounds, such as a commitment to some form of 
distributive justice.11  
Given the limited scope of the present essay, I will not 
attempt to provide the argumentation needed to defend this 
last claim, which remains somewhat controversial. Rather, I 
will simply assume that those who have argued that Marx and 
Marxists condemn capitalism as unjust and espouse 
socialism/communism on normative ethical grounds—at 
least in part—are correct. I will simply assume, in short, that 
the countless passages in which Marx and Engels (and 
subsequent Marxists) criticize capitalism for being inimical 
to self-realization, community, and equality warrant the 
conclusion that their condemnation of capitalism 
represented, at least in part, a moral condemnation.12 Anyone 
interested in these issues would do well to consult Norman 
Geras’s indispensable essays on Marx and justice (1986; 
1992), which provide a comprehensive survey of the relevant 
debates, while also establishing beyond doubt that Marx did 
indeed condemn capitalism as unjust.13 Yet although I cannot 
review the debates on Marx, Marxism, and justice here, I 
would like to address briefly two lines of reasoning against 
“moralizing” Marxism that, on the one hand, have been 
somewhat neglected in these debates and, on the other, are 
relevant to two of the putative deficiencies of ethical 
socialism that I have mentioned. The first line of reasoning 
holds that Marxism does not appeal to moral values at all 
because it is a science, while the second one holds that 
Marxism need not appeal to moral values because material 
interests can, by themselves, generate sufficient 
revolutionary motivation. Both lines of reasoning imply that 
Marxism is fundamentally different from ethical socialism. 
 Engels’s writings that plainly reflect a commitment to one or more 
of these goods. For a few brief examples of such passages, see Marx 
(1975), pp. 273-77; Engels (1975), pp. 246 and 248-49; Marx and 
Engels (1976), p. 439; Marx (1986), p. 530; Marx (1987), p. 91; and 
Engels (1987), pp. 95-99 and 277-80. 
13 According to G. A. Cohen (1995), “while Marx believed that 
capitalism was unjust, and that communism was just, he did not 
always realize that he had those beliefs” (p. 139). I believe that 
Cohen is right. 
 
 
 
 
ES
SA
YS
 
Llorente, R. (2020). El marxismo y el socialismo ético. Dialektika: Revista De Investigación Filosófica Y Teoría Social, 2(4), 
47-56. Recuperado a partir de https://journal.dialektika.org/ojs/index.php/logos/article/view/23 
52 
Dialektika REVISTA DE INVESTIGACIÓN FILOSÓFICA Y TEORÍA SOCIAL
As for the first of these responses, namely that Marxism is 
fundamentally different from ethical socialism because 
Marxism constitutes a science, two questions need to be 
addressed. The first question concerns the scientific status of 
Marxism: Is Marxism a science? Or, rather: In what sense, if 
any, can it plausibly be called a science?  
I think that it is quite clear today that Marxism’s credentials 
as science are rather unimpressive, at least if we take a more 
or less familiar notion of science as our standard. In one 
sense, this should not surprise us, for in explaining the 
purportedly scientific character of Marxism, Marxists 
typically employ a decidedly loose concept of science. For 
example, when Rosa Luxemburg (2004a) has occasion to 
clarify the “scientific basis of socialism,” she simply points to 
the fact that Marxism, unlike some rival socialist doctrines, 
duly appreciates “three results of capitalist development”: 
“the growing anarchy of the capitalist economy…the 
progressive socialization of the process of production...and 
the organization and class-consciousness of the proletariat” 
(p. 132; emphasis in the original).14 Of course, others might 
well cite Marxist economics in arguing for the “scientific” 
character of Marxism, but this is hardly a promising strategy: 
quite apart from the problems that arise in reducing Marxism 
to its economic component, many question the soundness of 
Marxist economics, or at least important elements of it. 
Yet let us assume, for the sake of argument, that Marxism 
does indeed constitute a science in a conventionally 
recognized sense of the term: Would this fact alone suffice to 
generate the characteristically Marxist condemnation of 
capitalism and defense of socialism? It should go without 
saying that this could only be the case if we were to reject the 
fact/value distinction, and assume that one can indeed 
uncontentiously derive an “ought” from an “is,” that is to 
say, proceed from descriptive premises to a prescriptive 
conclusion without introducing some normative premise in 
one’s argument. Now, some Marxists, underscoring that 
Marx himself appears to reject the fact/value distinction, 
 
14 Cf. Hal Draper’s characterization of scientific socialism cited 
earlier. 
 
15 See the brief discussion in Kamenka (1972), pp. 2-3, and cf. Sayers 
(1989), p. 95. 
 
16 Cited Kamenka (1972), p. 2. 
 
suggest that it is this perspective that allows one to deduce 
both a condemnation of capitalism and a commitment to 
socialism from Marxist science.15 The trouble with this 
position is, at bottom, twofold. First, whether or not Marx 
himself rejects the fact/value distinction, such a rejection 
constitutes a highly questionable theoretical stance. Second, 
even if it is possible to derive facts from values, it is still 
necessary to show why, precisely, these values—e.g., a 
commitment to socialism—follow from those facts; in other 
words, why, if the materialist conception of history is true, it 
follows that we ought strive to bring about socialism. As 
Rudolf Hilferding once put it, “it is one thing to recognise a 
necessity and another thing to work for this necessity. It is 
quite possible for someone convinced of the final victory of 
socialism to fight against it.”16 Of course, if, on the other 
hand, we are skeptical of Marxism’s scientific pretensions, or 
must implicitly use a very broad notion of science in granting 
Marxism’s status as a science, then surely we should regard 
Marxism as essentially a political philosophy, and therefore 
in part a moral outlook, as political philosophies inevitably 
contain a normative moral component. 
A second way of denying the thesis that Marxism is based on, 
or need be based on, moral values consists in arguing that 
such foundations prove unnecessary because Marxism 
appeals directly to material interests.17 This approach or 
strategy is, however, open to challenges on a number of 
grounds. Let me mention three of these. In the first place, we 
may note that avowed Marxists of all schools and stripes have 
regularly denounced capitalism in explicitly moral terms, 
which are often also the very terms that they use in presenting 
their own political ideals.18 In a similar vein, they have often 
underscored the higher moral caliber of militants inspired by 
Marxist thought; this was the case, for instance, of Alvaro 
Cunhal (1975), historic leader to the Portuguese Communist 
Party, who once published a pamphlet titled “The Moral 
Superiority of the Communists”. 19  
17 We find one statement of this idea in Levine (2005), p. 625.  
18 For some relevant passages from Marx, see Geras (1986; 1992). 
Many relevant passages from subsequent Marxists (as well as Marx 
and Engels) are cited in Lukes (1985). 
19 Lenin (1965) expresses a similar idea, when, in discussing the 
efforts of workers who performed voluntary labor, he refers to “the 
moral and political authority of the proletariat” (p. 423). 
 
 
 
 
ES
SA
YS
 
D I A L E K T I K A  ·  2 0 2 0 ,  2  ( 4 ) :  4 7 - 5 6 .  
REVISTA DE INVESTIGACIÓN FILOSÓFICA Y TEORÍA SOCIAL 
53 
Dialektika REVISTA DE INVESTIGACIÓN FILOSÓFICA Y TEORÍA SOCIAL
Secondly, the strict separation of interests from morality is 
implausible, for the simple reason that interests are in part 
constituted—that is, their content is determined—by moral 
beliefs. This is obviously the case if we conceive of interests 
along the lines of the definition suggested by the philosopher 
Simon Blackburn (1994), according to whom interests can be 
understood as “those things that a person needs, or that are 
conducive to his or her flourishing and success” (p. 196). But 
it is also obvious if we think of the conception of interest 
favored by many political scientists, who typically hold that 
interests reduce to fully informed preferences (Braybrooke, 
1987, p. 202), and bear in mind that the latter are, in turn, at 
least partly informed by values (albeit not necessarily moral 
values).  
Finally, it is in a sense disingenuous for Marxists to claim that 
by appealing to material interests they can dispense with any 
appeal to moral considerations, for Marxists actually use a 
notion of interests that subsumes morality, or at the very least 
conflates it with interests, insofar as moral commitments are 
a (superstructural) correlate, or expression, of certain class 
interests generated by the prevailing relations of production. 
Indeed, the connection between interests and morality tends 
to be, for Marxists, even tighter than it is for, say, non-
Marxist political scientists (who, as already noted, tend to 
equate interests with fully informed preferences); and the 
rough characterization of this connection offered by Howard 
Selsam (1988), a mid-twentieth-century American Marxist 
philosopher, is one that many Marxists would surely accept: 
“The struggle of the working class for the overthrow of 
capitalism is justified and right not only because it expresses 
their [sic] needs and interests, hence their ethics, but because 
their ethics is the highest or best possible at this stage of 
history” (p. 174). 
IV 
If we grant, then, that Marxism contains, as a central 
component, a normative moral orientation, and likewise 
grant that ethical socialism does not necessarily have any of 
the problematic or objectionable—from a Marxist 
standpoint—implications discussed above, the conventional 
 
20 For one example, see Nielsen (1989), p. 19. 
 
21 The second citation from Collier is in fact a section heading. Cf. 
Roberts (1996), p. 208 and Levine (2003), p. 27. 
contrast between Marxism and ethical socialism appears to 
lose much of its justification. Nonetheless, it remains true 
that even many Marxists who acknowledge that values figure 
centrally in Marx’s critique of capitalism and that Marxism 
includes a moral perspective tend to be dismissive of ethical 
socialism, when not actually employing the term as a slur.20 
The reason for this abiding aversion to the idea of ethical 
socialism surely derives, in most cases, from a rejection of 
anything smacking of a moralized conception of Marxism. 
Earlier I discussed the problems besetting two lines of 
reasoning against moralizing Marxism, that is, against the 
claim that Marxism does, or must, appeal to some moral 
commitments. (I should perhaps note, to avoid possible 
misunderstandings, that in referring to a “moralization of 
Marxism,” I am not endorsing moralizing, whether from a 
Marxist outlook or from any other perspective.) Before 
concluding, I would like to address briefly one other concern 
registered by some commentators who are critical of 
approaches to Marxism that emphasize its normative ethical 
dimensions. For these commentators, the problem is, as 
Andrew Collier (1981) succinctly puts it, “that there are no 
specifically socialist values,” and this is why we should refrain 
from “basing the case for socialism on values” (p. 22; 
emphasis in original).21 In short, if one appeals to putatively 
socialist values in advocating socialism, one will be appealing 
to values that are also central to other political philosophies 
and doctrines, and so be making the case for them as well. 
It is probably true that “there are no specifically socialist 
values”: freedom, equality, community, non-domination, 
self-realization and the other values, or goods, usually 
invoked by Marxists are also upheld by adherents of rival 
political philosophies and doctrines. In fact, one 
interpretation of Marxism, that which views it as an 
“immanent critique” of liberalism, effectively identifies the 
values of Marxism with those of liberalism.22 At any rate, to 
argue that we ought not to base the case for (Marxist) 
socialism on values because there are no specifically socialist 
values is to ignore the fact that a political philosophy’s (or 
doctrine’s) interpretation of the values that it defends matters 
as much as the values themselves in defining the essence of 
22 See, for example, Gamble (1999), p. 4 and Mills (1962), p. 26. 
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the political philosophy in question. (For this reason, it 
makes sense to say that different political philosophies appeal 
to the same values only if we consider the values as abstract 
generalities.) Different interpretations, and combinations, of 
the same values yield different theoretical conclusions and 
imply different practical policies, which is why, say, socialist 
democracy does not mean the same thing as liberal 
democracy. In short, to the extent that (Marxist) socialists’ 
understanding of certain values (or goods) differs from the 
understanding of these same values in rival political 
traditions, it seems quite reasonable to appeal to these values 
in arguing for socialism. 
V 
By way of conclusion, let me mention a few of the benefits of 
duly appreciating the moral dimensions of Marxism. To 
begin with, this interpretation of Marxism affords us an 
accurate understanding of the essence of Marxism as a 
theoretical tradition and political project, something that 
remained beyond reach so long as Marxism “sought to 
obscure from itself and others a feature integral to its nature”  
(Geras, 1992, p. 65). Secondly, the moral interpretation of 
Marxism also helps to elucidate the significant affinities 
between Marxism and religion, which mainly concern moral 
commitments and have very little to do with the superficial 
parallels that are so often cited in this connection. Thirdly, 
this understanding of Marxism facilitates a more robust 
unification of Marxism and feminism, which will never occur 
so long as we think of the former as a non-moral scientific 
project and the latter as a politico-moral philosophy, or 
doctrine. Finally, the moral interpretation of Marxism offers 
us insight into Marxism’s enduring appeal, which is, without 
question, far greater than that of any form of ethical 
socialism, and understandably so. 
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